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1.Introduction 
Automated web application penetration testing is 
becoming ubiquitous with the development of 
computer programs that capable of simulating tester 
activities of web application penetration testing. 
Computer programs like HTTrack [1] or Maltego [2] 
were invented to aid penetration tester in intelligent 
information gathering. The invented web application 
security scanners like Acunetix [3] scanned web 
applications for vulnerability assessment. In the 
meanwhile, exploitation tools like Metasploit and 
WFuzz are created to compromise web application 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
 
The web application penetration testing methodology 
of [4] showed web application security scanner 
always has a critical role in scanning the web 
application for vulnerability detection. 
 
*Author for correspondence 
 
 
Web application security scanner simulates the 
actions of penetration tester of inspecting the target 
web application security. Subsequently, penetrating 
the security of web application attack vectors with 
selected attack strings. The web application is 
vulnerable if it responds positively towards the 
injected attack strings, or otherwise. The texts of [5] 
and [6] showed automated web application 
penetration testing is beneficial to pen-testers, which 
the scanner not only reduced resources, times, labour 
work, and costs required for conducting a web 
application penetration testing, the scanner also 
eliminates pen-tester reliance on human knowledge. 
Moreover, the web application security scanner 
preserved the human knowledge of web application 
penetration testing by converting them into an 
executable computer program. 
  
The invention of web application security scanners 
has made automated web application penetration 
Review Article 
Abstract  
The web application security scanner is a computer program that assessed web application security with penetration 
testing technique. The benefit of automated web application penetration testing is huge, which web application security 
scanner not only reduced the time, cost, and resource required for web application penetration testing but also eliminate 
test engineer reliance on human knowledge. Nevertheless, web application security scanners are possessing weaknesses 
of low test coverage, and the scanners are generating inaccurate test results. Consequently, experimentations are 
frequently held to quantitatively quantify web application security scanner's quality to investigate the web application 
security scanner's strengths and limitations. However, there is a discovery that neither a standard methodology nor 
criterion is available for quantifying the web application security scanner's quality. Hence, in this paper systematic review 
is conducted and analysed the methodology and criterion used for quantifying web application security scanners' quality. 
In this survey, the experiment methodologies and criterions that had been used to quantify web application security 
scanner's quality is classified and review using the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
(PRISMA) protocol. The objectives are to provide practitioners with the understanding of methodologies and criterions 
that available for measuring web application security scanners’ test coverage, attack coverage, and vulnerability detection 
rate, while provides the critical hint for development of the next testing framework, model, methodology, or criterions, to 
measure web application security scanner quality.  
 
Keywords 
Web application security scanner, Penetration testing, Quality criteria, PRISMA. 
 
Seng et al. 
286 
 
testing a popular research trend. In this research field, 
practitioners have translated the web application 
penetration testing's testing techniques into 
executable programs, to enhance weak algorithms to 
detect new web application vulnerability, or to 
address the challenge of scanning modern web 
application that continuously expanding in both size 
and complexity. 
 
A computer is merely a dummy machine that 
performs the calculation based on the written 
algorithm. Therefore, writing a sophisticated 
algorithm to achieve the objective of automated web 
application penetration testing is important in this 
research field. Unfortunately, humans tend to make 
mistakes. Moreover, the process of translating web 
application penetration testing's testing techniques 
into the executable computer program is tedious and 
error-prone. Hence, the designed algorithms are not 
always perfect, and the issue of false positives and 
false negatives are common for automated web 
application penetration testing.  The false positives 
are consumed pen-tester extra effort and times to 
eliminate the fake vulnerability, while the false 
negatives are impaired pen-tester judgement in 
deciding an under-test web application security. 
Consequently, documents such as [6−10] are 
labelling web application security scanners as 
inaccurate and untrustworthy. This elaborate the 
phenomena of why experimentations are often held to 
quantify the web application security scanner‟s 
quality. 
 
An intriguing discovery is that the methodology and 
criteria used for measuring web application security 
scanner's quality are varying in existing publishing 
manuscripts. Moreover, there is neither a standard 
nor a technical document by authorized parties that 
defined the approach for quantifying web application 
security scanner's quality. Although web application 
security consortium (WASC) did publish web 
application security scanner evaluation criteria 
(WASSEC) [11] in the year of 2009. However, 
WASSEC has been just a checklist that described the 
features of the web application security scanner. 
Moreover, the corresponding checklist has never 
received any update for the year it was published. 
The NIST special publication 500-269 [12] published 
by the NIST SAMATE project is another out-dated 
technical document that contained the similar 
content.  Therefore, in this paper, preferred reporting 
items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
(PRISMA) protocol is used to classify and review the 
experiment methodology of published conference 
proceedings and journal papers that had the quality of 
web application security scanner quantified, to 
convey the compelling approach of measuring web 
application security scanner's quality. 
 
The remaining part of the survey is consists of 
following sections. Section 2 defines the web 
application security scanners. Section 3 elaborates the 
concept of quantifying the web application security 
scanner‟s quality. Section 4 presents the literature 
review's methodology.  Subsequently, section 5 
reviews the published methodologies. Section 6 
classifies the manuscripts based on the selected 
indices. Finally, section 7 concluded the survey paper 
with the conclusion remarked.   
 
2.Understanding of web application 
security scanner  
Web application security scanner is a computer 
program that assesses web application security via 
simulating the pen-tester action of penetrating the 
web application security selected attack strings 
[13−16]. Figure 1 showed the general architecture of 
the web application security scanner. 
 
The white box, black box, and hybrid web 
application security scanner are created to 
automatically assess web application security in 
either black box or white box testing environment. 
The black box testing environment is a testing 
environment that web application codes are not 
reachable, while white box testing environment has 
the total opposite meaning. Therefore, white box web 
application security scanners perform the 
vulnerability assessment by inspecting the 
propagation of malicious data on web application 
codes via a control flow graph (CFG) or data flow 
graph (DFG) [17−21]. On the other hand, black box 
web application security scanner assesses web 
application security by inspecting the web application 
execution behaviours for anomalies detection 
[22−26].   
 
Hybrid web application security scanners are unique 
in such a way that both software static and dynamic 
testing techniques are used to assess the web 
application security scanner. The hybrid web 
application security scanner parsed the code and also 
examines the web application execution behaviours. 
According to [27] and [28], the software static and 
dynamic testing techniques are integrated to improve 
the test coverage and to reduce the possibility of 
producing the false positive and false negatives. 
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Web application security scanners scan a web 
application security with passive and active scanning.  
In the passive scanning, the scanner collects 
information of under-test web application with 
reconnaissance algorithm. Then, in active scanning, 
exploitation is performed to compromise web 
application confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
using the security penetration algorithm. This include 
performs the vulnerability detection with information 
flow analysis or anomaly detection. Therefore, a web 
application security scanner generally contains a 
reconnaissance component, security penetration 
component, and vulnerability detection component 
[20, 29–31]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The general architecture of web application security scanner 
 
3.The web application security scanner’s 
quality quantification 
The web application security scanner‟s quality is 
often quantified to investigate strengths and 
limitations of existing algorithms, or to evaluate web 
application security scanner or recently designed 
algorithm. According to the literature of [9, 32−34], 
quantification of web application security scanner's 
quality is achievable by challenging web application 
security scanner‟s features with test-beds. The 
practised experiment methodology usually consists of 
preparation, execution, and reporting phases. The 
preparation phase defined the experiment's objectives 
and scopes.  The preparation phase also includes 
having the selected test-beds and web application 
security scanners configured and installed.  Then, in 
the execution phase, web application security 
scanners are configured to scan the test-beds. Lastly, 
collected experimental results are charted and filed in 
the reporting phase. The virtualization is common in 
existing experiment methodologies for reducing both 
the complexity and cost required, to set up a web 
application penetration testing lab. The guideline to 
set up a virtual penetration lab is available in [35]. 
 
4.The methodology  
The paper conducts the survey based on the PRISMA 
protocol of [36]. The completeness and transparency 
of PRISMA protocol have made PRISMA protocol 
the methodology of this survey. Figure 2 showed the 
flow diagram of PRISMA protocol. 
 
PRISMA protocol has an intriguing subject 
systematically reviewed with these four activities, 
namely identification, screening, eligibility, and 
included.  
 
Identification: International conference proceedings 
and journal papers of six major publishers, which are 
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(IEEE), Emerald Insight, Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM), ScienceDirect, Springer, and 
Google Scholar, were surveyed in this survey paper. 
Manuscripts of this area of interest were collected 
from these publishers using the keywords of „web 
application penetration testing‟, „automated web 
application penetration testing‟, „web application 
security scanner‟, „web application security testing‟, 
„web vulnerability scanner‟, and „web pen-test‟. 
Overall, 290 manuscripts were retrieved with 
keywords stated above. 
Screening: In this screening process, 114 
manuscripts were discarded to eliminate the 
duplication. In the meanwhile, the remaining 144 
manuscripts were carried forward for full-text 
reading. 
Eligibility: In this phase, full-text of 144 manuscripts 
were comprehensively reviewed, to define their 
eligibility.  The process had 54 manuscripts 
discarded, because of the poorly executed experiment 
methodology. 
Included: Finally, experimental methodologies of 
elected manuscripts are qualitatively and 
quantitatively synthesized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Flow diagram of PRISMA protocol 
 
4.1Data quantification 
The final stage of the survey quantitatively 
synthesizes collected data according to selected 
indices. The survey categorizes the data based on 
indices of the year of publication, publisher, web 
application vulnerability, test-beds, measurement 
metric, and web application security scanner. This 
data are quantified to deliver practitioners with the 
compelling approach of quantifying web application 
security scanner‟s quality. In addition to that, it is to 
provide future works with critical hints of designing 
next testing framework, measurement metric, test-
bed, or model to quantify web application security 
scanner‟s quality. 
 
5.Approaches for scanner’s quality 
quantification  
The quality of web application security scanner is 
quantified to achieve these four objectives, which 
are: 
a. To compare the white box and black box web 
application security scanners' quality.  
Identification 
Full-text articles exclude 
with reasons  
(n = 55) 
Studies included in qualitative synthesis  
(n = 90) 
Full-text articles assessed for eligibility  
(n = 90) Eligibility 
Records screened  
(n = 144) 
Screening 
Records identified through database 
searching  
(n = 290) 
Records after duplication removed  
(n = 257) 
Records excluded  
(n = 114) 
Included 
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b. To clarify web application security scanners‟ 
strengths and limitations. 
c. To benchmark a recently proposed algorithm. 
d. To clarify the web application security scanner's 
test coverage. 
 
In this section, the corresponding experimentations 
are reviewed to show their findings and 
methodologies.   
 
5.1White box and black box scanners comparison 
The experiment distinguishes the state-of-the-art of 
white box and black box web application security 
scanner. It is also to clarify the strengths and 
limitations of white box and black box web 
application security scanners in vulnerability 
detection. The experiments were conducted by 
having both scanners scanned the same vulnerable 
web applications. 
 
Subsequently, the obtained experimental results were 
compared, to clarify their performance. According to 
experimental results of [9] and [33], white box web 
application security scanners achieve better test 
coverage than black box web application security 
scanners because of the code visibility. Therefore, 
black box web application security scanner tends to 
generate the false negatives. However, white box web 
application security scanners are susceptible to false 
positives. 
  
5.2Clarifying scanners strengths and limitations 
The web application security scanners are quantified 
to clarify their test coverage, scanning efficiency, 
attack coverage, and the capability to detect a class of 
web application vulnerability. The experiment was 
conducted by configured the scanners to scan 
selected vulnerable web applications. Summing up 
experimental results of [6, 7, 18, 22, 23, 26, 30, 34, 
37–46], web application security scanners not only 
tends to generate false alarm, the coverage issue is 
quite concerning in automated web application 
penetration testing. Besides this, web application 
security scanners are exceptionally good in detecting 
reflected cross-site scripting and SQL injection. 
Unfortunately, hard work is still required to make 
web application security scanners detect the advance 
web application vulnerabilities. Moreover, the 
coverage issue is yielded, because of the challenge to 
scan, modern web applications that has rich media. 
 
5.3Benchmarking the algorithms 
Experiments are also conducted to validate the 
recently designed algorithms. The objective is to 
ensure the algorithm had addressed the targeted 
research problem. The experiment has the algorithm 
scan the selected vulnerable web applications. Then, 
the algorithm is validated by comparing the collected 
experimental results with those obtained with 
existing algorithms. [47–49] experimental results 
showed the proposed code parsing and reverse 
engineering algorithms are efficient in scraping data 
entry points (DEPs) and attack vectors from under-
test web applications. In the meanwhile, [50–60]‟s 
experimental results showed leveraging of search-
based testing technique, mutation testing technique, 
and genetic algorithm are effective in improving the 
attack coverage. Moreover, anomaly detection and 
information flow analysis by [8, 9, 27, 28, 31], and 
[61–79] are proven effective in detecting the web 
application vulnerability in either black box or white 
box testing environment. Besides this, the developed 
prototypes are validated in [5, 20, 25, 29], and [80− 
99]. 
 
5.4Scanner coverage clarification 
These experiments quantify web application security 
scanners by configured the scanners to crawl selected 
web applications. Experiment results of [80−82] 
showed the authors‟ information knowledge manager 
(IKM) and topic model manages to increase the 
number of visited web pages by 28%. In the 
meanwhile, [100] experimental result showed test 
coverage is expandable by hooking JavaScript API 
onto dynamic analysis, to detect registered events, 
URLs, and web forms. 
 
5.5Related works 
Several testing frameworks were proposed by 
practitioners to quantify web application security 
scanner‟s quality. Authors of [101−103] introduced a 
testing framework that quantifies web application 
security scanner's quality with fault injection 
technique. These frameworks defined a web 
application security scanner‟s quality by measuring 
the capability of web application security scanner to 
detect the faults introduced with fault injection 
technique. Besides this, [104, 105], and [106] have 
proposed the alternative measurement metrics to rank 
web application security scanner‟s quality. [104] 
introduced true duplication and false duplication to 
describe web application security scanner's duplicate 
results, while [105] proposed the sensitive data flow 
coverage with an attempt to replace conventional 
branch coverage and statement coverage. In the 
meanwhile, [106] introduced the web application 
security scanner grading system to grade web 
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application security scanner's quality with the fuzzy 
classifier. 
 
6.Classification of the methodologies 
This section classifies methodologies of publishing 
manuscripts based on selected indices. The selected 
indices are the type of manuscript, the manuscript‟s 
year of publication, the manuscript‟s publisher, the 
testing technique of web application security scanner, 
the web application vulnerability, the test-beds, and 
measurement metrics used to describe web 
application security scanner‟s quality. 
 
6.1The assortment of academic manuscripts 
The section classifies collected academic manuscripts 
to convey publishers that have a high interest in this 
subject of automated web application penetration 
testing. Then, this section classifies the manuscripts 
based on how this area of research is delivered to 
public. The data showed the relevant area of research 
were frequently published in six publishers of 
ScienceDirect, IEEE, ACM, Emerald Insight, Google 
Scholar, and Springer, which well-known for 
publishing books, ebooks, and peer-reviewed journals 
in science, engineering, and computer science. 
Amongst these publishers, IEEE, Springer, and the 
ACM have the highest publication rate of 47.8%, 
18.9%, and 14.4% respectively.  However, only a 
manuscript is from Emerald Insight, since the 
publisher is specialist more in fields like business and 
management, education, and marketing, with only 
several books series and journals covered the 
engineering. Unfortunately, relevant researches were 
frequently published as conference proceedings or 
symposiums, instead of journal papers with 
frequencies of 23.3% and 76.7% respectively.  The 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 classify manuscripts by 
publisher and manuscripts' type.   
 
6.2 The assortment of manuscript by publication 
year 
The section classifies related academic manuscripts 
by their year of publication to convey the research 
trend of automated web application penetration 
testing. As depicted in Figure 5, this research topic is 
continuously gaining its popularity, begin from the 
year of 2000 to 2018. The research topic‟s popularity 
is reaching its peak in the year 2014, which 16.7% of 
the manuscripts were published in that year. 
Nowadays, the trend of automated web application 
penetration testing remains attractive with an average 
of 5 manuscripts were published in the year 2015, 
2016, and 2017.  
 
6.3 The assortment of web application security 
scanners   
The section classifies web application security 
scanners involved in the experiments with their 
testing technique and licensing to convey web 
application security scanners that available for 
automatically assessing web application security, 
while to deliver those most accessible for 
benchmarking purpose. Overall, the experiments had 
quantified 93 web application security scanners, 
which 87 of them are black box web application 
security scanners, while 8 of them are white box web 
application security scanners. The 87 black box web 
application security scanners showed 29 of them are 
open-source, 10 of them are closed software while 
remaining 48 web application security scanners are 
from academia. On the other hand, the manuscripts 
only had eight white box web application security 
scanners' quality quantified, which 5 of them are 
open-source, and 3 of them are developed in 
academia. Table 1 showed the tested web application 
security scanners. 
 
Figure 6 showed quantification of black box web 
application security scanners' quality were more often 
than white box web application security scanners. 
The reason is collected manuscripts are often 
describe automated web application penetration 
testing as a kind of black box software testing 
technique.  In fact, manuscripts have a term called a 
static analyser to describe the automated white box 
web application testing.  Consequently, the quality of 
black box web application security scanners called an 
Acunetix web vulnerability scanner, WebInspect and 
AppScan are often quantified with frequencies of 
11.5%, 6.3%, and 9.9% respectively.  In addition to 
that, 17.8% of manuscripts were tested web 
application security scanners developed in academia. 
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Figure 3 The division of academic manuscripts by publisher 
 
 
Figure 4 The division of academic manuscripts by the type of document 
 
 
Figure 5 The division of academic manuscript by publication year 
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Figure 6 Frequencies “web application security scanner” was evaluated 
 
Table 1 The assortment of web application security scanners by the licensing and testing approach 
Licencing  Testing approach Items The web application security scanner/ web spider/ parser 
Commercialized Black box S1 Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner 
S2 HailStorm 
S3 WebInspect 
S4 Appscan 
S5 McAfee SECURE 
S6 Qualysguard 
S7 NeXPose 
S8 BurpSuite 
S9 N-Sparker 
S10 Retina 
Open source Black box S11 Teleport 
S12 Wapiti 
S13 W3af 
S14 WebCruiser 
S15 Wasapy 
S16 PowerFuzz 
S17 WebXSSDetector 
S18 wget 
S19 Skipfish 
S20 Harvest 
S21 Vega 
S22 PownMe 
S23 N-Stalker 
S24 Mikito 
S25 WebScarab 
S26 WebRavor 
S27 WebSPHNIX 
S28 Larbin 
S29 Websecurity 
S30 Web-Glimpse 
S31 SQLfast 
S32 SQLmap 
S33 ARDILLA 
S34 Arachni 
S35 NTOSpider 
S36 ZAP 
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Web application security scanner 
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Licencing  Testing approach Items The web application security scanner/ web spider/ parser 
S37 Nikto 
S38 Wikto 
S39 Paros 
White box S40 Grep 
S41 FindBugs 
S42 Yasca 
S43 IntellJIDEA 
S44 PHPMinerII 
Academia Black box S45 WAVES, Saner, VS. WS., CIVS-WS, WebSSARI, Andromeda, 
Multi-agent scanner, Attack injection tool, RWSS, Wasapy, WASC, 
PAPAS, PIUIVT, Sania, Secubat, ARDILLA, MUBOT, MUSIC, 
MUTEC, MUFORMAT, XSS analyser, Sign-WS, WS-Attacker, 
Vulnerability & Injection Tool, WASAPY, Confleagle, SOA-
scanner, SQLIVDT, LigRE, ETSSDetector, NVS, WebGuardia, 
SQLfast, Idea, Volcano, ANOVA, PMVT, THAPS, XquerryFuzzer, 
JÄK, WAPTT, BIOFUZZ, KamaleonFuzz, CRS, XSSPeeker, 
Inferential, XiParam, DetLogic 
White box S46 ITS4, Pixy, WAP 
 
6.4 The assortment of web application 
vulnerability 
The section delivers web application vulnerabilities 
that detectable with automated web application 
penetration testing. Table 2 showed 54 web 
application vulnerabilities that detectable with 
automated web application penetration testing. Table 
2 grouped relevant web application vulnerabilities, 
according to open web application security project 
(OWASP) Top 10 [107], with brief descriptions are 
provided to elaborate each class of web application 
vulnerability. Web application vulnerabilities are left 
unclassified if it doesn‟t fit the OWASP top 10. 
 
 
Table 2 Classification of web application vulnerabilities by OWASP Top 10 
OWASP Top 10 Items Vulnerability Description (Deriving from OWASP) 
Injection attacks V1 SQL injection Insertion of SQL queries to modify integrity, 
availability, confidentiality of database data. 
V2 XPath injection Compromising of integrity, availability, or 
confidentiality of data in XML.  
V3 OS command injection Execution of arbitrary commands in the host 
operating system through the vulnerable web 
application. 
V4 Code injection Execution/interpretation of injected code in the 
web application. 
V5 Command injection Execution of command on the host system 
through a vulnerable web application. 
V6 Script injection Arbitrary scripts execution. 
V7 XQuery injection Incorporation of malicious data into XQuery 
pattern to alter the XQuery logic. 
V8 SSI injection Manipulation of the file system and process of 
web server process. 
File inclusion V9 Remote file inclusion The remote inclusion of file that could bring harm 
to the target application. 
V10 Local file inclusion Inclusion local harmful files to the target web 
application. 
V11 Arbitrary file upload Upload of the malicious file that can bring harm to 
the target application. 
V12 Arbitrary file inclusion The inclusion of malicious file that can bring 
harm to the target application. 
Session related vulnerability V13 Session fixation The hijacking of the valid user session. 
V14 Session prediction Prediction of the session ID values. 
V15 Session hijacking Exploitation of web session control mechanism. 
Broken authentication V16 Authentication bypass Bypass web application's authentication scheme. 
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OWASP Top 10 Items Vulnerability Description (Deriving from OWASP) 
V17 Insufficient authentication Usage of weak passwords or poorly protected 
application. 
Broken authorization V18 Broken access control Weakly enforced restrictions for authenticated 
users. 
V19 Insufficient password discovery Bypass password authentication schemes with 
weak password recovery mechanism. 
V20 Insufficient authorization Authorized users have loosely configured 
restriction. 
Security misconfiguration V21 SSL misconfiguration Misconfiguration of the server to force the usage 
of cryptographic options. 
V22 Insecure temporary file Creation and usage of insecure temporary files 
that lead to compromising of application security. 
V23 Predictable resource location Uncover hidden web content and functionality of 
target application. 
V24 misconfiguration Misconfigured application stack. 
Using component with known 
vulnerabilities 
V25 Input sanitization Inappropriate input sanitization functions. 
Sensitive data exposure V26 Path traversal Accessing files and directories that stored outside 
the web root directory. 
V27 Error message disclosure Accidentally reveals of error codes. 
V28 Username/ password disclosure Reveals of username or password. 
V29 Server path disclosure Reveals of server‟s path. 
V30 Information leakage Reveals of the internal state of the application. 
V31 Insecure object reference Direct access to protected objects by the user's 
supplied input. 
Insecure deserialization   V32 Code vulnerability Leveraged of insecure codes. 
V33 Code execution Execution of injection code by the application. 
HTTP manipulation V34 HTTP response splitting The inclusion of malicious characters in HTTP 
response header without being validated. 
V35 Parameter tampering Manipulation of the value of HTTP parameter.  
V36 Parameter pollution Supplying of HTTP parameter with the similar 
name to alter the way application is interpreting 
the parameter value. 
V37 HTTP request smuggling Tamper HTTP requests or responses with 
malformed HTTP requests. 
Spoofing V38 Content spoofing Defacement of the web application with text 
injection. 
V39 SOAP spoofing Defacement of HTTP header element known as 
SOAPAction. 
V40 WS-addressing spoofing Adding of routing information to the SOAP 
header to allow asynchronous communication. 
Poisoning V41 Cache poisoning Duplicate headers in a single header field. 
V42 Cookie poisoning Filling in the cookie attribute to make browser 
send the cookie within the cross-site request. 
Uncategorized V43 Abuse use of functionality Misused of application functions and features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V44 Cross-site scripting Injection and sending of malicious scripts to the 
other end user. 
V45 Clickjacking Transparent or opaque layer for malicious web 
browsing. 
V46 Buffer overflow Submission of malicious data to corrupt web 
application execution stack. 
V47 Cross-site request forgery Force execution of malicious actions by the web 
application. 
V48 SOAP/ AJAX attack Injection of malicious data to 
alter  XMLHttpRequest logic. 
V49 Denial of service Making resources of web application unavailable. 
V50 Hidden field manipulation Disabling resources of a web application. 
V51 Drive-by download Injection of a legitimate web page with malicious 
code to infect legitimate web page. 
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OWASP Top 10 Items Vulnerability Description (Deriving from OWASP) 
 
 
 
 
 
V52 Format string bug Injection of the input string for evaluating as a 
command by the web application. 
V53 Unvalidated redirect Injection of malicious input to trigger malicious 
URL redirect. 
V54 Insufficient process validation Failure in enforcing application business logic. 
 V55 Logic vulnerabilities Fault in application logic. 
 
In summary, the manuscripts had quantified web 
application security scanners' capability in detecting 
eight injection-based attacks, four file inclusion, three 
session related vulnerabilities, two broken 
authentication, three broken authorization, four 
security misconfiguration, one usage of component 
with known vulnerability, six data exposure 
vulnerability, two insecure deserialization, four 
HTTP manipulation, three spoofing, and eight 
uncategorized web application vulnerability. In 
existing manuscripts, the study of SQL injection and 
cross-site scripting are the most common with 
frequencies of 32.6% and 22.4% respectively, while 
34.8% of the academic manuscripts covered both 
SQL injection and cross-site scripting. Unfortunately, 
evaluation of web application security scanners' 
quality for others web application vulnerabilities is 
rare as elaborated in Figure 7.  
 
 
 
Figure 7 Frequencies “web application vulnerability” was evaluated 
 
6.5 The assortment of test-bed 
The section delivers the test-beds that available for 
benchmarking web application security scanner‟s 
quality and their pros and cons. Test-bed is a very 
vulnerable web application that contained a finite 
number of vulnerabilities or challenges [26, 37, 41, 
103]. The test-bed is having a critical role in 
benchmarking web application security scanner‟s 
quality. Existing experiment methodologies often 
quantify web application security scanners‟ quality 
by configuring the scanners to scan selected test-
beds. Then, web application security scanners' 
vulnerability detection rate or what that most relevant 
are measured to define their quality. Table 3 showed 
four test-beds are available to benchmark web 
application security scanner quality.  
Figure 8 showed 45.6% of experiment methodologies 
benchmark web application security scanner‟s quality 
with open-source web application framework, while 
17.3% and 16.3% of experimental methodologies 
evaluate web application security scanner's quality 
with educational vulnerable web applications and 
web application security scanner test sites 
respectively. Only 5.4% experiment methodologies 
use custom-made web application developed by 
students or teaching assistant due to their validity is 
questionable. 
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Table 3 Test-beds for benchmarking web application security scanner‟s quality 
Items Category Description Pros Cons Test-beds 
W1 Custom-made web 
 application 
Practitioners developed 
vulnerable web 
applications. 
 
No concern for 
committing the 
cybercrime. 
Never validated. 
Manual testing is 
required to 
validate results 
validity. 
Not well 
documented. 
Custom web 
applications 
developed by a 
group of teaching 
assistants, 
researchers, or 
students 
W2 Educational vulnerable 
web application 
Very vulnerable web 
applications that for 
educational purpose. 
Web application 
vulnerabilities are 
known. 
Well 
documented. 
No concern for 
committing the 
cybercrime. 
Manual testing is 
not required. 
Limited web 
application 
vulnerabilities. 
Limited 
challenges. 
Only well-known 
web application 
vulnerabilities are 
testable. 
Damn Vulnerable 
Web Application 
(DVWA), online 
bookstore, 
WebGoat, 
Gryyere, 
P0wnMe!, 
Multillidae, 
YAVWA, WIVET 
W3 Web application 
security scanner test 
sites 
Test-site that specifically 
for benchmarking web 
application security 
scanner. 
Web applications 
vulnerability is 
known. 
Well 
documented. 
No concern for 
committing the 
cybercrime. 
Manual testing is 
not required. 
Limited web 
application 
vulnerabilities. 
Limited 
challenges. 
Only well-known 
web application 
vulnerabilities are 
testable. 
WackoPicko, PCI, 
MatchIt, W-VST, 
Scan-bed 
W4 Open-source web 
application framework 
The open-access framework 
that supports web 
application development. 
No concern for 
committing the 
cybercrime. 
 Not well 
documented. 
 Manual 
testing is required 
to validate result 
validity. 
Drupal, phpBB, 
WordPress, 
Django, SatchMo, 
Vanilla, Gallery, 
SCARF, 
Reference, 
PHPFusion, 
PHPBlog, 
PHPNuke, 
PHPMyAdmin, 
TikiWiki, PHP 
Gallery, MyBB, 
Moodle, TestLink, 
SquirrelMail, 
Elgg, FeedSearch, 
RssReader, 
LampCMS, 
Joomla, PhpNN, 
MediaWiki, 
OwnCloud, Tidio, 
Nibbleblog, 
Modx-CMS 
W5 Real-world web 
application 
Web application live on the 
World Wide Web. 
Web application 
security scanner's 
capability can 
genuinely reveal.  
Cybercrime may 
be conducted. 
Not well 
documented. 
Manual testing is 
required to 
validate result 
validity.  
Alexa top ranking 
sites. 
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Figure 8 Frequencies the test-bed was leveraged for benchmarking purpose 
 
6.6 The assortment of measurement metrics 
The section delivers measurement metrics available 
for quantifying web application security scanner‟s 
quality. Overall, practitioners have 13 measurement 
metrics to scale web application security scanner's 
test coverage; 7 measurement metrics to compute 
web application security scanner's attack coverage; 
18 measurement metrics to measure web application 
security scanner's vulnerability detection rate; 5 
measurement metrics to measure web application 
security scanner's scanning efficiency. The test 
coverage described the part of a web application that 
successfully scanned by a web application security 
scanner. In the meanwhile, attack coverage explains 
DEP that had been penetrated with attack payloads, 
while vulnerability detection rate elaborate web 
application vulnerability that successfully detected by 
a web application security scanner. On the other 
hand, scanning efficiency elaborates the time 
required to complete a vulnerability scanning session. 
Table 4 showed the stated measurement metrics used 
to quantify web application security scanner's quality. 
 
 
Table 4 Measurement metrics to quantify web application security scanner quality 
Criteria Items Metrics Description (By the authors) 
Test coverage M1 Number of URLs The number of URLs that a web application security scanner had 
visited. 
M2 Number of networks 
generated 
The number of networks produced by a web application security 
scanner in a vulnerability scanning session. 
M3 Number of web pages 
visited 
The number of web pages visited by a web application security 
scanner in a vulnerability scanning session. 
M4 Code coverage The degree of web application source code that is tested by a web 
application security scanner. 
M5 Test coverage The degree of a web application that had been successfully tested by 
a web application security scanner. 
M6 Number of links The number of links that a web application security scanner had 
successfully retrieved. 
M7 Surface coverage Surface and sink coverage retrieved by a web application security 
scanner. 
M8 Testing level Description of the testing approach, either in a black box or white 
box manner. 
M9 Number of data extracted The number of data that successfully extracted. 
M10 Capability to bypass 
authentication scheme 
Description of the ability of a web application security scanner in 
provides an authentication scheme with valid data. 
M11 Reachability scores The faction of retrieved entry points over the entry points of a web 
application. 
M12 Number of forms 
retrieved 
The number of web forms that a web application security scanner 
manages to retrieve. 
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Criteria Items Metrics Description (By the authors) 
Attack coverage M13 Number of injection point The number of entry points that retrievable by a web application 
security scanner. 
M14 Number of vector The number of inputs used to test a web application. 
M15 Granularity of test case Description of the object that constitutes a test case. 
M16 Source of test case Description of artefacts used to generate the test case. 
M17 Test case generation 
method 
Description of approach that converts the source of test cases into a 
set of test cases. 
M18 Number of attack vector The number of retrievable paths. 
M19 Number of test case 
generated 
Amount of test cases produced by a web application security scanner 
in a scanning session. 
Vulnerability 
detection 
M20 Number of vulnerability The number of vulnerability produced by a web application security 
scanner. 
M21 Number of false positive The number of unreal vulnerability produced by a web application 
security scanner. 
M22 Number of false negative The number of vulnerability missed by a web application security 
scanner. 
M23 Number of true positive The number of benign vulnerabilities reported by a web application 
security scanner. 
M24 Number of true negative The number of benign vulnerabilities that not reported by a web 
application security scanner. 
M25 F-measure Harmonic means of recall and precision. 
M26 Recall The probability to produce a benign vulnerability. 
M27 Precision The fraction of benign vulnerability from vulnerabilities reported. 
M28 Detection score The fraction of vulnerability detected over vulnerabilities that 
possessed by a test-bed. 
M29 Number of true 
vulnerability 
The number of benign vulnerabilities. 
M30 Number of false alarm The number of false positives and false negatives 
M31 Detection rate The ratio of the found vulnerabilities. 
M32 Vulnerability coverage Amount of vulnerability that detectable. 
M33 Detection coverage Percentage of detectable vulnerabilities. 
M34 Number of true 
duplication 
The number of duplicate true positives. 
M35 Number of false 
duplication 
The number of duplicate false positives. 
M36 Coverage The number of vulnerabilities detected. 
M37 Fitness The number of vulnerability covered by a test case. 
Efficiency M38 Scanning time Amount of time required to complete a vulnerability scanning. 
M39 Parsing time Amount of time required to complete parsing a set of codes. 
M40 Automation level The capability to complete a scanning session without tester 
involvement. 
M41 Processing overhead Amount of extra time required to complete a scanning session. 
M42 Productivity Average time requited to generate a test case. 
 
In existing academic manuscripts, it is common that 
web application security scanners were quantified to 
measure their vulnerability detection rate. Therefore, 
Figure 9 showed measurement metrics like the 
number vulnerability, the number of false positives 
and the number of false negatives are the three most 
common measurement metrics used to measure web 
application security scanner‟s quality with 
frequencies of 24.2%, 20.8%, and 5.6% respectively. 
However, [33] had defined F-measure as the most 
suitable measurement metrics to measure web 
application security scanner‟s quality. 
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Figure 9 Frequencies “measurement metric” is used to measure web application security scanner quality 
 
7.Conclusion and future work 
Quantifying a web application security scanner's 
quality with sophisticated methodology is essential 
for the following reasons. Firstly, a sophisticated 
methodology help in accurately defined web 
application security scanner‟s strengths and 
limitations, especially in locating weakly designed 
algorithms. Secondly, to deliver a platform to allow 
researchers scientifically and precisely present their 
concept, idea, algorithm, or achievement in the field 
of automated web application penetration testing to 
the public. Third and the last, precise methodology 
are significantly effected advancement of this 
research field. Unfortunately, existing 90 academic 
manuscripts, neither have a standard methodology 
nor measurement metric to quantify web application 
security scanner's quality, although the relevant study 
is common. There is only a common practice that 
web application security scanner‟s quality was 
quantified by configuring the scanner to scan selected 
test-beds. Then, practitioner quantified a scanner's 
quality by calculating the number of vulnerabilities 
detected. Consequently, the survey showed 
practitioners use the diverse set of methodologies, 
test-beds, web application security scanners, and 
measurement metrics to quantify web application 
security scanner‟s quality. 
 
Although the survey has presented the compelling 
approach to quantify the quality of web application 
security scanners' quality, as well as exhibit the test-
beds, web application security scanners, and 
measurement metrics to measure web application 
security scanner‟s quality. However, the survey 
delivers more research questions, instead of giving 
the answer of providing the sophisticated 
methodology to quantify web application security 
scanner's quality. For instance, the suitable amount of 
test-beds or web application security scanners to 
benchmark a web application security scanner or 
algorithm is unknown. In existing academic 
manuscripts, it showed the number of web 
application security scanners and test-beds used to 
benchmark a web application security scanner is 
ranging from the minimum number of zero to the 
maximum number of a thousand. Besides this, fittest 
measurement metrics to describe a web application 
security scanner's test coverage, attack coverage, 
vulnerability detection rate, and scanning efficiency 
are also unknown. The survey showed practitioners 
had quantified web application security scanner‟s 
quality with less meaningful and redundant 
measurement metrics. Practitioners had measured 
web application security scanner's capability for 
vulnerability detection with measurement metrics of 
vulnerability detection rate and the number of 
vulnerabilities, which carries the same definition. In 
the meanwhile, measurement metrics of surface 
coverage and the number of links are too ambiguous 
to define web application security scanner‟s test 
coverage. Since the scope of surface coverage is 
difficult to define, meantime the number of links 
cannot represent a web application's coverage 
because modern web applications not only consist of 
links but also other web elements that critical for 
vulnerability assessment. Therefore, there is an 
assuring future work for this area of this research.  It 
is about producing a compelling methodology and 
metric system to quantify web application security 
scanner‟s quality, to precisely deliver the findings of 
related research field to practitioners.  
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Appendix 
The assortment of methodologies by objectives 
Objective Prototype 
scanners  
The scanners Test-beds Vulnerabilities Metrics Authors 
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WebSSARI  230 random open-source web 
applications of SourceForge. 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
Not clearly defined. [80−81] 
Name unknown  Burp Suite 
 W3af 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 Django basic blog 
 Django forum 
 Satchmo online shop 
 Reflected cross-site 
scripting 
 Persistent cross-site 
scripting 
 The number of 
injection points. 
[98] 
Secubat   100 random web applications  SQL injection. 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
web pages. 
 The number of 
forms visited. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[85] 
Name unknown  Wget 
 W3af 
 Skipfish 
 Gallery 
 WordPress V.2 
 WordPress V.3 
 SCARF 
 Vanilla Forum 
 WackoPicko 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Code coverage. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false alarms. 
 The number of 
true 
vulnerabilities. 
[99] 
ITS4  Grep  I-pay  C++ and C code 
vulnerabilities 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
[86] 
Saner   Jetbox 
 MyEasyMarket 
 PBL GuestBook 
 PHP-Fusion 
 SendCard 
 Input sanitization 
function 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[87] 
VS. WS  WebInspect 
 AppScan 
 Acunetix Web 
Vulnerability 
Scanner 
 300 random web applications  SQL injection  The number of 
true 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[8] 
CIVS-WS  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 AppScan 
 WebInspect 
 FindBugs 
 Yasca 
 IntelliJIDEA 
 ProductDetail 
 NewProducts 
 NewCustomer 
 ChangePaymentMethod 
 JamesSmith 
 PhoneDir 
 Bank 
 Bank3 
 Xoperation 
 SQL injection 
 XPath injection 
 The number of 
true 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[61, 9] 
Name unknown  WebScarab 
 Webravor 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 RenRen 
 Kaixin001 
 163.com 
 SQL injection  The number of 
visited web pages. 
 The number of 
true positives. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[49] 
Andromeda   AJAXChat 
 Altorol 
 App. A 
 Blojsom 
 BlueBlog 
 Contineo 
 Dlog 
 Friki 
 GestCV 
 Ginp 
 JBoard 
 JpetStore 
 JugJobs 
 Photov 
 StrutsArticle 
 WebGoat 
 Cross-site scripting 
 SQL injection 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
true positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
[88] 
XSS analyser   15552 server defences  Cross-site scripting  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[50] 
Pixy   PHPBlog 
 PHPNuke 
 Gallery 
 PhpMyAdmin 
 Cross-site scripting  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[5] 
International Journal of Advanced Computer Research, Vol 8(38) 
301          
 
Objective Prototype 
scanners  
The scanners Test-beds Vulnerabilities Metrics Authors 
 Serendipity 
 Yapig 
Multi-agent 
scanner 
  Drupal  Stored cross-site 
scripting 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[89] 
Attack Injection 
Tool 
 AppScan 
 WebInspect 
 TikiWiki 
 phpBB 
 MyReferences 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[101] 
Name unknown   Timeclock-software 
 RoomPHPlaning 
 PHP inventory 
 Green Desktiny 
 Meshoutbox 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
 The number of 
web pages visited. 
 The number of 
attack vectors. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities 
[20] 
RWSS  AppScan 
 WebInspect 
 Open-source blogging platform 
 Open-source customer 
management 
 Not clearly defined  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
links. 
 Surface coverage. 
[90] 
Name unknown   Employee directory 
 Bookstore 
 Events 
 Classified 
 Portal 
 Command injection 
attack 
 Precision. [65] 
Wasapy  Skipfish 
 W3af 
 Wapiti 
 phpBB 
 SecurePage 
 Hardware Store 
 Insecure 
 Damn vulnerable web application 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[66] 
Wasapy.   6 self-developed web applications  SQL injection  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negative.  
 Detection rate. 
[70] 
WASC   PHP-Post 
 Jupiter CMS 
 PHP Gallery 
 Absolute path traversal 
 MyBBoard 
 SQL injection 
 Script injection 
 Parsing processing 
time. 
[69] 
PAPAS  50000 unique URLs from public 
database of Alexa 
 Parameter pollution  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[29] 
Name unknown  WebScarab  WebGoat  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site request 
forgery 
 Predictable resource 
location 
 HTTP request 
smuggling 
 HTTP response 
splitting 
 Cache poisoning 
 Denial of service 
 Content spoofing 
 Hidden field 
manipulation 
 Driver-by download 
 Information leakage 
 Session fixation 
 Insufficient 
authentication 
 Insufficient 
authorization 
 Brute force 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
 The number of 
attack vectors, 
 Detection rate. 
 False alarm rate. 
[91] 
PIUIVT  Nikto2 
 Wikto 
 MvnForum  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[51] 
Sania  Paros  E-learning  SQL injection  The number of [52] 
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Objective Prototype 
scanners  
The scanners Test-beds Vulnerabilities Metrics Authors 
 Bookstore 
 Portal 
 Event 
 Classified 
 Employee directory 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
Sign-WS  WebInspect 
 Rational AppScan 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 TPC-APP 
 TPC –C 
 TPC-W 
 SQL injection  Detection 
coverage. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[62] 
WS-Attacker   Apache Axis 
 JBossWS Native 
 JBossWS CXF 
 .NET web service 
 SOAP action 
spoofing 
 WS-addressing 
spoofing 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[92] 
Name unknown   Top 1000 websites from Alexa  Clickjacking attack  Detection rate. 
 The number of 
true positives. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[93] 
Vulnerability & 
injection tool 
  TikiWiki 
 phpBB 
 MyReferences 
 SQL injection  Test coverage. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[102] 
Name unknown  3 custom web applications  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cookie poisoning 
 Iframe session 
 Session hijacking 
Not clearly defined. [94] 
Confleagle  W3af 
 Skipfish 
 WebSecurity 
 SquirrelMail 
 Gallery 
 myBB 
 TestLink 
 phpMyAdmin 
 Elgg 
 Moodle 
 SugarCRM 
 MediaWiki 
 Misconfiguration  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[95] 
SOA-Scanner   TV-Shows 
 FeedRegistry 
 TvHelper 
 FeedSearch 
 RssFeeder 
 SQL injection 
 XPath injection 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 Test coverage. 
[71] 
SQLIVDT  W3af 
 Nikto 
 Wapiti 
 Vega 
 ZAP 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 3 self-developed web application 
by 7master students and 2 
teaching assistant 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[72] 
LiGRE  PownMe 
 Wapiti 
 W3af 
 Skipfish 
 WebGoat 
 Gruyere 
 WordPres 
 Elgg 
 phpBB 
 E-Health 
 P0wnMe! 
 Cross-site scripting  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positive. 
 The number of 
false negative. 
[53] 
ETSSDetector  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 N-Stalker 
 WebCruisher 
 PowerFuzz 
 WebSecurify 
 WebXSSDetector 
 Testphp 
 Webscantest 
 Cross-site scripting  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
 The number test 
generates. 
[54] 
Name unknown  W3af 
 Wapiti 
 LampCMS  Crawling AJAX 
web application 
 The number of 
web pages. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
[47] 
NVS  Acunetix Web 
Vulnerability 
Scanner 
 NetSparker 
 Web Cruiser 
 Karnel Travel 
 Online Real State 
 ICC World Cup II 
 Online tutorial 
 Graphics 
 Travel 
 SQL injection  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
[73] 
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Objective Prototype 
scanners  
The scanners Test-beds Vulnerabilities Metrics Authors 
 Jobsite 
 Education 
Name unknown  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 WebInspect 
 AppScan 
 TPC-App 
 TPC-C 
 TPC-W 
 SQL injection 
 XPath injection 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 Test coverage. 
[63] 
Name unknown  Vega 
 ZAP Proxy 
 Mikito 
 Wapiti 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 W3af 
 AppScan 
 HR 
 Farm 
 News 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[31] 
WebGuardia Not clearly defined  WackoPicko  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Unvalidated 
redirect 
 Secure direct object 
references 
 Security 
misconfiguration 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
[96] 
WAP  Pixy 
 PhpMinerII 
 phpMyAdmin 
 Multillidae 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
[27] 
Name unknown  WebInspect 
 AppScan 
 ProductDetail 
 NewProducts 
 NewCustomer 
 ChangePayment Method 
 SQL injection  Detection 
coverage. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[64] 
Name unknown  Wasapy 
 Skipfish 
 W3af 
 Wapiti 
 AppScan 
 Acunetix Web 
Vulnerability 
Scanner 
 WebInspect 
 phpBB-3 
 SecurePage 
 HardwareStore 
 Insecure 
 Damn vulnerable web application 
(DVWA) 
 Cyphor 
 Seagull 
 Ftss 
 Rioptx 
 Pligg 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities, 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[68] 
 WebSSARI 
 WAVES 
 Teleport 
 WebSpnix 
 Larbin 
 Web-Glimpse 
 230 random web applications of 
SourceForge 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[84] 
SQLfast   WebGoat 
 Damn vulnerable web application 
(DVWA) 
 Joomla! 
 Yet another vulnerable web 
application (YAVWA) 
 SQL injection  The number of 
data extracted. 
 Capability to 
bypass 
authentication 
scheme. 
[79] 
Idea  SQLfast  WAVSEP  SQL injection  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[55] 
Name unknown  FindBugs  ChangePaymentMethod 
 NewCustomer 
 NewProducts 
 ProductDetail 
 SQL injection 
 XPath injection 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[97] 
Volcano   Web applications from cyber 
security bulletin 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[105] 
ANOVA   APhpKb 
 PhpPlanner 
 Yapig 
 Mantis 
 Cross-site scripting  Coverage. 
 Fitness. 
 Time. 
 Productivity. 
[74] 
PMVT  Rational AppScan 
 NTOSpider 
 W3af 
 Skipfish 
 Arachni 
 Stud-e  Multi-step cross-
site scripting 
 Coverage. 
 Fitness. 
 Time. 
 Productivity. 
[74] 
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jÄk  Skipfish 
 W3af 
 Wget 
 State-aware crawler 
 Crawljax 
 WIVET 
 Joomla 
 Modx-CMS 
 Nibbleblog 
 WordPress 
 Tidio 
 myBB 
 phpNN 
 Gallery 
 Piwigo 
 OwnCloud 
 MediaWiki 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
tests. 
[100] 
THAPS   WordPress  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[48] 
Name unknown  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 WatchFire AppScan 
 WebInspect 
 MyReferences  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[103] 
XqueryFuzzer  ZAP Attack Proxy  Bookstore 
 Classified 
 WIVET 
 XQuery injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[57] 
Name unknown.  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 NetSparker 
Not clearly defined  SQL injection 
 Buffer overflow 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Cross-site request 
forgery 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
[75] 
Name unknown  Nikto 
 Wikto 
 phpBB Not clearly defined  Detection rate. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[76] 
WAPTT  W3af 
 Nikto 
 Wapiti 
 Vega 
 ZAP Proxy 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
3 vulnerable web application from 
postgraduate students and teaching 
assistants. 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Buffer overflow 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[28] 
BIOFUZZ  ARDILLA 
 SQLmap 
 WebChess 
 Schoolmate 
 FaqForge 
 geccBBlite 
 phpMyAddressBook 
 Elemate 
 SQL injection  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[58] 
KamaleonFuzz  P0wnMe 
 W3af 
 Wapiti 
 Skipfish 
 P0wnMe! 
 WebGoat 
 Gruyer 
 WordPress 
 Elgg 
 phpBB 
 E-Health 
 Cross-site scripting  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[59] 
Cross-request 
scanner (CRS) 
  HSBC 
 BEA 
 BOC 
 HSB 
 CitiBank 
 Webjet 
 JetStar 
 Parameter 
tampering 
 The number of 
true positives. 
 The number of 
true negatives. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
[25] 
XSS Peeker  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 NetSparker 
 N-Stalker 
 NTOSpider 
 Skipfish 
 W3af 
 WackoPicko. 
 Custom developed web 
applications. 
 Cross-site scripting.  The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
attack payloads. 
[23] 
Inferential  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 SQLMap 
 AppScan 
 WAVSEP  SQL injection  The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
true positives. 
 The number of 
[77] 
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scanners  
The scanners Test-beds Vulnerabilities Metrics Authors 
URLs. 
 False positive rate. 
XiParam   5 web applications from 
GotoCode 
 Custom developed web 
applications 
 XQuery injection 
 Parameter 
tampering 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
attack requests. 
 The number of 
successful attacks. 
 The number of 
vulnerable forms. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
[60] 
Not clearly 
defined 
 1854 PHP projects on Github  SQL injection 
 Command injection 
 Code injection 
 Arbitrary file read/ 
write 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Session fixation 
 The number of 
sinks. 
 The number of 
calls. 
[78] 
DetLogic  LogicScope  WackoPicko 
 Scarf 
 OpenIT 
 Puzzlemall 
 Logic flaws  The number of 
URLs. 
 The number of 
Forms. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
[108] 
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  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 HailStorm 
 WebInspect 
 Rational AppScan 
 McAfee SECURE 
 QualysGuard.PCI 
 NeXPose 
 Drupal 
 phpBB 
 WordPress 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Arbitrary file 
upload 
 Remote file 
inclusion 
 OS command 
injection 
 Code injection 
 Session fixation 
 Session prediction 
 Authentication 
bypass 
 Cross-site request 
forgery 
 SSL 
misconfiguration 
 Insecure HTTP 
methodologies 
 Insecure temporary 
file 
 Path traversal 
 Source code 
disclosure 
 Error message 
disclosure 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
 The number of 
generated 
network. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[37] 
 Not clearly defined  WackoPicko  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Code injection 
 Broken access 
control 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
 Detection score. 
 Reachability 
score. 
[46] 
  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 AppScan 
 WebInspect 
 Qualys 
 27 custom developed web 
applications 
 SQL injection. 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Information leakage 
 Cross-site request 
forgery 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[38] 
  AppScan 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 WebInspect 
 300 random web applications  SQL injection 
 XPath injection 
 Code execution 
 Buffer overflow 
 Username/ 
password disclosure 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 Test coverage. 
[7] 
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 Server path 
disclosure 
  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 AppScan 
 BurpSuite 
 HailStorm 
 Retina 
 Qualys 
 WebInspect 
 Vendor‟s test sites  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Authentication 
bypass 
 Command injection 
 XPath injection 
 SOAP/ AJAX 
attack 
 Cross-site request 
forgery 
 HTTP response 
splitting 
 Arbitrary file 
upload 
 Remote file 
inclusion 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
 Elapsed scanning 
time. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
[6] 
  AppScan 
 HailStorm. 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 Hackme 
 OWASP Site Generator Project. 
 WebGoat 
 File inclusion 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[34] 
  Splat 
 WAVES 
 Secubat 
 ARDILLA 
 MUBOT 
 MUSIC 
 Wilela‟s prototype 
 Tappenden‟s 
prototype 
 Salas‟s prototype 
 Breech‟s prototype 
 Offutt‟s prototype 
 McAllister‟s 
prototype 
 MUFORMAT 
 MUTEC 
 Not defined  Buffer overflow 
 SQL injection 
 Format string bug 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Vulnerability 
coverage. 
 Test automation 
level. 
 Testing level. 
 Granularity of test 
cases. 
 Source of test 
case. 
 Test case 
generation 
method. 
[39] 
  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 AppScan 
 QualysGuard 
 PCI 
 WackoPicko 
 MatchIt 
 Stored SQL 
injection 
 Traffic of 
scanners. 
[40] 
  AppScan 
 WebInspect 
 Paros 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 W-VST  Not clearly defined  F-measure. 
 Precision. 
 Recall. 
[18] 
  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 AppScan 
 ZAP 
 WackoPicko 
 Scan-bed 
 Stored SQL 
injection 
 Stored cross-site 
scripting 
 The number of 
attack vectors. 
[41] 
 Not clearly defined  W-VST Not clearly defined  The number of 
true duplication. 
 The number of 
false duplication. 
[104] 
  Zap attack proxy. 
 Skipfish. 
 Damn vulnerable web application 
(DVWA) 
 Web application scanner 
evaluation project (WAVSEP) 
 Cross-site scripting 
 SQL injection 
 File inclusion 
 Precision 
 The number of 
false positives. 
[30‟] 
  SAMATE  CBMC 
 K8-sight 
 Pcline 
 Prevent 
 SCA 
 Gianna 
 Cx-enterprise 
 Codesonar 
Not clearly defined  Precision. 
 Recall. 
 F-measure. 
[42] 
  Acunetix Web 
Vulnerability 
Scanner. 
 AppScan. 
 QualysGuard. 
 MatchIt 
 PCI 
 WackoPicko 
 Persistent SQL 
injection 
 The number of 
vulnerabilities. 
[26] 
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  BurpSuite 
 ZAP Proxy 
 WebGoat 
 Multillidae II 
 Damn vulnerable web application 
(DVWA) 
 Bodgeit 
 Gruyere 
 Cross-site scripting  Coverage. [43] 
  Arachni 
 Wapiti 
 Skipfish 
 WAVSEP 
 AltoroMutual 
 Web scanner test site 
 WIVET 
 Acunetix test sites 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Crawler coverage. 
 True positive rate. 
 True negative rate. 
 False positive rate. 
 False negative 
rate. 
 Positive predictive 
values. 
 Negative 
predictive values. 
 False omission 
rate. 
 Accuracy. 
 F-measure. 
 Scanning speed. 
 Vulnerability 
detection 
accuracy. 
[44] 
  Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 BurpSuite 
 ZAP Proxy 
 NetSparker 
 AppSpider 
 Arachni 
 Vega 
 Wapiti 
 Skipfish 
 ironWASP 
 W3af 
 WAVSEP  SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 Remote file 
inclusion 
 Path traversal / 
local file inclusion 
 Precision. 
 Recall. 
 F-measure. 
 The number of 
false positives. 
 The number of 
false negatives. 
 The number of 
true positives. 
[45] 
  Vega 
 Arachni 
 ZAP Proxy 
 Multillidae II 
 Butterfly project 
 WackoPicko 
 DVWA 
 Juice hop 
 Null byte 
 SQL injection 
 Insufficient 
password recovery 
 Code injection 
 SSI injection 
 Abuse of 
functionality 
 XPath injection 
 Insufficient process 
validation 
 Detection rate. [22] 
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  WebInspect 
 AppScan 
 Acunetix web 
vulnerability scanner 
 FindBugs 
 Yasca 
 IntellijIDEA 
 TPC-APP service 
 TPC-C web service 
 TPC-W web service 
 SQL injection  Precision. 
 Recall. 
 F-measure. 
[33] 
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WAVES  Teleport 
 Web Sphnix 
 Harvest 
 Larbin 
 Web-Glimpse 
 Google 
 NAI 
 Lucent 
 Trend Macro 
 Palm 
 Olympic 
 Apache 
 Verisign 
 Ulead 
 Cert 
 Maxtor 
 Mazda 
 Linux Journal 
 Cadillac 
 Web500 
 SQL injection 
 Cross-site scripting 
 The number of 
webpage. 
[82, 83] 
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